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Subversive Science 
Dov Fox 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article introduces the phenomenon of subversive science, 
reveals its operation in modern American society, and analyzes its 
implications for law and policy amidst calls to defund or repress 
controversial lines of inquiry. Existing debates center on whether cutting-
edge science casts doubt on abstract ideals that animate our legal system, 
from racial equality to criminal responsibility. This focus misses the 
deeper and more practical danger that lies in how citizens misperceive and 
misapply these ideals in election and trial decisions. What makes certain 
science “subversive” is its power to shake the public’s faith in those 
democratic cornerstones. 
Emerging bodies of psychology research show that presenting voters 
with genomic studies of group differences makes them less willing to fund 
early education for the underprivileged. In a similar vein, brain imaging 
studies—that predict whether people will commit certain acts before they 
even intend to—can lead jurors to question free will and acquit guilty 
defendants. Neither scientific illiteracy nor cultural worldviews explains 
away these results, defying the orthodoxy that individuals conform their 
views on contested matters to their command of the facts or values that 
define their identities. 
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Reframing the debate about subversive science means targeting the 
transmission of knowledge, rather than its production. I advance a range 
of systematic reforms to combat the alternative facts and cognitive bias 
through novel forms of engagement in congressional hearings, classroom 
lessons, and courtroom testimony. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Let the facts be known as they are, and the law will sprout from 
the seed and turn its branches toward the light.” 
— Benjamin Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for Law1 
 
“There are various things we simply ought not to know.” 
— Nicholas Rescher, Forbidden Knowledge2 
 
Science can liberate the law or corrupt it. Some of these influences 
are familiar. Sound forensics can help put criminals away, while flawed 
tools and tests can deprive the innocent of their liberty. More subtly, 
however, scientific discoveries can force us to rethink the ideals that our 
legal system accepts as true: Do genetic studies of intelligence imperil 
norms of group equality, as when states discriminate on the basis of sex or 
race?3 Does brain imaging erode the assumption of responsibility for 
action that’s subject to civil suit or prosecution?4 Might neuroscience 
undermine the mind-body dualism that distinguishes mental phenomena 
from physical ones in doctrines from tort harm to criminal intent?5 
Scientific inquiries that carry this power to shake core assumptions 
in the law have historically gone by the name of “forbidden knowledge.”6 
But the moniker is misleading. There is nothing especially menacing about 
knowledge on its own, separate and apart from why it is pursued or how it 
is used. Awareness or understanding of some subject can be troubling only 
when those facts are sought for bad reasons, or when such data are put to 
bad effects.7 Knowledge itself, however forbidding, does not plausibly 
 
1. Benjamin Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for Law, 5 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. 
MED. 581, 583 (1929). 
2. NICHOLAS RESCHER, FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE 9 (1987). 
3. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age, 
25 LAW & INEQ. 429, 455–62 (2007). 
4. See, e.g., Uri Maoz & Gideon Yaffe, What Does Recent Neuroscience Tell Us 
About Criminal Responsibility?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 120, 132–38 (2015). 
5. See, e.g., Dov Fox & Alex Stein, Dualism and Doctrine, 90 IND. L.J. 975, 985–92 
(2015). 
6. See Erika C. Hayden, Taboo Genetics, NATURE, Oct. 3, 2013, at 26; Joanna 
Kempner et al., Forbidden Knowledge, 307 SCI. 854 (2005); Paul R. Wolpe, Reasons 
Scientists Avoid Thinking about Ethics, 125 CELL 1023 (2006); see generally PHILIP 
KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND DEMOCRACY (2001); RICHARD C. LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS 
IDEOLOGY (1992); RICHARD SHATTUCK, FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE (1996); DAVID 
BALTIMORE ET AL., LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY (Gerald Holton & Robert Morrison eds., 
1979); Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik & Daniel Schulthess eds., Forbidden Knowledge, 79 
MONIST (1996); Gary E. Marchant & Stephanie J. Bird, Editors’ Overview: Forbidding 
Science?, 15 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 263 (2009). 
7. Even in the Garden of Eden what God forbid was not the existence or discovery of 
the tree’s fruit, but eating it. Cf. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 3, 98, 137, 282 (1821). 
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qualify as forbidden. The phenomenon needs a new name. I call it 
subversive science.8 
What makes certain lines of scientific inquiry “subversive,” in the 
sense I mean, is not that it deprives subjects of informed consent to 
participate in an experiment, or that it exposes them to unjustified 
suffering.9 Nor is it that research visits unknown dangers on future 
generations, as germline editing of human embryos might.10 The 
subversive element of science that I have in mind is not even the risk that 
dual-use studies of airborne viruses or nuclear power can be put to either 
peaceful or destructive ends—to sustain goods like public health or 
national security, or imperil them.11 
Science subverts by disrupting cherished ideologies. One example is 
the widely held conviction that individuals choose among different 
possible courses of action unimpeded by force or fate. This sense of free 
will goes to the heart of subjective identity. Another example is an 
animating feature of our social fabric, such as principles of moral equality 
that withstand any number of individual or (average) group differences. 
Where research might challenge such ideals, many people would give it 
free rein, either because the intrinsic value of truth is too great to trade off 
or because their compensating benefits inexorably outweigh whatever 
havoc the results of that research may wreak.12 
Others would stifle such scientific study.13 Scholars across multiple 
disciplines and political stripes have pressed agencies that consider human 
 
8. The expression has little resonance today. It was coined a half-century ago by 
ecologist Paul B. Sears, Ecology: A Subversive Subject, 14 BIOSCIENCE 11, 11 (1964), who 
argued that conservation research, “if taken seriously as an instrument for the long-run 
welfare of man-kind, would . . . endanger the assumptions and practices accepted by 
modern societies.” 
9. Such debasing or harmful methods have discredited notorious research throughout 
U.S. history. The Tuskegee study denied poor black men treatment for syphilis after 
penicillin was known to cure the disease. SUSAN M. REVERBY, EXAMINING TUSKEGEE: THE 
INFAMOUS SYPHILIS STUDY AND ITS LEGACY 32–50 (2009). Milgram had participants 
believe they electrocuted innocent strangers. GINA PERRY, BEHIND THE SHOCK MACHINE 
65–94 (2012). And the Stanford experiment let subjects acting as “guards” subject 
prisoners to psychological torture. PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT 26–47 
(2007). 
10. See Gina Kolata & Pam Belluck, Why Are Scientists So Upset About the First 
Crispr Babies?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2E44tNN; see also Julia D. 
Mahoney & Gil Siegal, Beyond Nature? Genomic Modification and the Future of 
Humanity, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 204–06 (2018). 
11. See Filippa Lentzos & Pamela Silver, Synthesis of Viral Genomes, in 
INNOVATION, DUAL USE, AND SECURITY 133–38 (Jonathan B. Tucker ed., 2012). 
12. This permissive approach is typified by essays published in leading scientific 
journals like Cell, Nature, and Science. See Hayden, supra note 6, at 26; Kempner et al., 
supra note 6,  854; Wolpe, supra note 6, at 1023. 
13. See generally KITCHER, supra note 6; LEWONTIN, supra note 6; SHATTUCK, supra 
note 6; BALTIMORE ET AL., supra note 6; Lekka-Kowalik & Schulthess, supra note 6); 
Marchant & Bird, supra note 6). 
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subject inquiries to “reject proposed research that will promote racial 
theories of intelligence” for “fostering racism even if not motivated by” 
it.14 And they have implored scientists to “exercise restraint” in reporting 
on brain studies that risk “disabusing people of the [free will] illusions that 
undergird all they hold dear.”15 Calls to restrict this science ring loud and 
clear: “If the choice is between the true and the good, then for the sake of 
society, the true must go.”16 
Both perspectives have a point. The laissez-faire position appreciates 
the critical role of science in a free society, and heeds historical lessons 
from Galileo’s inquisition to the Scopes trial.17 This view neglects cause 
for concern about subversive science in a “post-truth”18 world, in which 
social media algorithms increasingly supply “alternative facts” to fortify 
whatever people already believe.19 The alternative, reactionary stance is 
alert to these dangers. But it undervalues the emancipatory power of 
scientific discoveries—from Earth orbiting the sun to Homo sapiens 
evolving from apes—to cast out unsound ideals or breathe life into tired 
ones.20 
This Article charts a third path. I would deflect the threat of 
subversive science from abstract conceptions of equality, responsibility, 
or dualism. The larger danger concerns the practical ways in which 
scientific research can lead people to misperceive those ideals. This middle 
ground advises policies that target the transmission of knowledge, not its 
production. It would resist calls to defund or restrict subversive science in 
favor of mediating its transmission to the public in ways that are designed 
to avoid misunderstanding.21 
 
14. John Horgan, Should Research on Race and IQ Be Banned?, SCI. AM.: CROSS-
CHECK (May 16, 2013), https://bit.ly/2QesJRl. 
15. Stephen Cave, There’s No Such Thing as Free Will, ATLANTIC (June 2016), 
https://bit.ly/2gY2HEe. 
16. Id. Or take the Trump administration’s treatment of global warming, which 
embarrasses its creed of America First. See Dov Fox, Can Trump Censor Climate Science?, 
HUFF POST (Aug. 31, 2017, 11:55 P.M.), https://bit.ly/2VCTMae. The White House quickly 
shut down the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) climate webpage and forbid 
agency scientists from discussing their research with media or the public. See Editorial 
Board, Editorial, President Trump’s War on Science, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2wRc0K5. 
17. JULES SPELLER, GALILEO’S INQUISITION TRIAL REVISITED 145–60 (2008); 
MICHAEL BURGAN, THE SCOPES TRIAL: FAITH, SCIENCE, AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 52–63 
(2010). 
18. Amy Wang, Post-Truth Named 2016 Word of the Year by Oxford Dictionaries, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://wapo.st/2w6XMFx. 
19. See Olivia Ward, Truth, Lies and Democracy: Journalism in the Age of Trump, 
BILLMOYERS.COM (Mar. 13, 2017), https://bit.ly/2mCSxIb. 
20. See DAVID B. RESNIK, PLAYING POLITICS WITH SCIENCE 115–32 (2009). 
21. See infra Part II.C. 
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I focus on two central cases of subversive science: genetics research 
that lawmakers invoke to oppose social welfare programs, and 
neuroscience that criminal lawyers present to exculpate defendants. 
Recent and prominent examples abound in each. As for genetics, many 
bristle at policies relying on group-difference claims to advocate 
eliminating equality-promoting programs such as Head Start.22 When it 
comes to the neuroscience, the United States Supreme Court forbids the 
harshest punishments for juvenile offenders by appeal to brain imaging 
that infers “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions” result 
from children’s “underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”23 Legal scholars 
variously fret and celebrate the prospect that new research could reduce 
the ascription of culpability even to adults of sound mind who commit 
crimes.24 
  Legal scholars have responded by appeal to theory. No scientific 
fact, they say, could weaken rationales for treating citizens as responsible 
equals.25 Understandings of equality indeed look immune to empirical 
challenge, while concepts of responsibility withstand such encounters for 
now, even if brain research might yet one day disprove free will as a 
justification for punishment. Science can wear down not only abstract 
ideals, but also the ways in which they are adopted in practice. Existing 
literature neglects this far more pressing question about the impact that 
this science can have on the decisions people make about law and policy. 
Society should resist calls to suppress or obscure subversive science, 
while attending to its real, distinct, and substantial misinformation 
challenges. This Article sets forth clear roles for the scientists who produce 
knowledge, the reporters who impart it to the public, and the citizens—
voters, jurors, activists—who fold these facts into their public decisions. 
These stakeholders must hold subversive science to domain-specific 
standards of proof before incorporating its implications into their stock of 
working assumptions about the world. 
Part I of this Article defines the democratic ideals of responsibility 
and equality and distinguishes theoretical conceptions of those ideals from 
people’s practical perceptions of them. Part II examines research 
 
22. See Toby Helm, Michael Gove Urged to Reject ‘Chilling Views’ of His Special 
Adviser, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2013, 3:57 P.M.), https://bit.ly/2WTdT5r (discussing a 
memo urging the education secretary to execute reforms reflecting evidence that “up to 
70% of a child’s performance is related to his or her genes”). 
23. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
24. See, e.g., Matthew Drecun, Cruel and Unusual Parole, 95 TEX. L. REV. 707, 715–
16 (2017); Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to 
Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2013). 
25. See JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL 53–54 (1999); 
Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience, Free Will, and Criminal Responsibility, in FREE WILL 
AND THE BRAIN 251, 254 (Walter Glannon ed., 2015). 
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developments in genetics and neuroscience that threaten to subvert these 
ideals and spells out why and how certain among these discoveries lay 
widely shared perceptions of those ideals on the line, without imperiling 
our best conceptions of them. Part III advances an original framework of 
cross-cutting policies to combat cognitive bias. It ranges from scientific 
engagement and knowledge brokers to rules about the admission of and 
warnings about expert testimony in courts and Congress. 
II.  DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 
Scientific advances have long been assumed to challenge two ideals 
that anchor our legal system. The first of these is the responsibility of 
adults with normal capacities to control the conduct in which they engage. 
The notion that we are responsible for our actions, and should be treated 
as such, animates a broad swath of law and policy that expects us to 
comport our behaviors to certain rules, and blames or punishes us for not 
doing so.26 The second ideal is equality—here, I focus on moral and legal 
equality among salient groups based upon, for example: sex and race. That 
individual members of these groups are, and should be, treated as equal 
animates important rules and norms against discrimination and 
exclusion.27 
Responsibility and equality operate at theoretical and practical levels 
that are crucial to distinguish. How legal theorists or moral philosophers 
conceive of their contours in theory is one thing—this constitutes the 
conception of each ideal. But even scholarly consensus may fail to 
persuade lay people, who may perceive the meaning of responsibility and 
equality in ways that depart from model theory. Common understandings 
of these ideals—perceptions of what they mean—are what matter when 
members of the public rely on those beliefs on juries and in elections. This 
distinction between conceptions and perceptions is central to my 
argument: Subversive science can shape how decision-makers perceive 
responsibility and equality, even as it leaves the way theorists conceive of 
those ideals unscathed. These distinctive influences on perceptions and 
conceptions warrants leaving these controversial lines of inquiry to 
proceed unobstructed, while imparting their results to the public with 
greater care. 
 
26. See THOMAS GREEN, FREEDOM AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN 
LEGAL THOUGHT 10 (2014); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 167–79 
(1990). 
27. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 
MICH. L. REV. 575, 575 (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, General Propositions and Concrete 
Cases (with Special Reference to Affirmative Action and Free Speech), 31 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 369, 373 (1996). 
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A. Responsibility 
Responsibility, in the moral and legal sense I have in mind, requires 
more than just acting in a way that risks some harm or causes some 
danger.28 It goes beyond a sufficiently close causal connection between an 
action—bumping a bag-toting train passenger, for example—and the 
resulting injury when the fireworks within that bag explode.29 Much of our 
law reflects the common intuition that individual freedom to choose some 
course of action matters morally, apart from its consequences, in 
attributing blame. The rules setting forth fines and jail time insist that 
punished acts be done voluntarily and culpably—this ideal of individual 
responsibility figures prominently in criminal law. Its significance comes 
from more than how the law conceives of that ideal in theory. It also 
matters how decision-makers perceive it in practice. 
1. Conceptions 
To hold a person criminally responsible for some action he performs, 
the law demands (for all but strict liability crimes) that he do more than 
just act in a way that causes a prohibited outcome. He must consciously 
will the action with a culpable state of mind, such as an intent to harm, 
knowledge of its likelihood to endanger others, or unjustified indifference 
to such risks.30 These requirements for conviction explain why causing 
even mass destruction will not make a defendant responsible if he is too 
young (no guilty mind), sleepwalks (no voluntary act), or otherwise lacks 
the power, capacity, or opportunity to do what is legally required.31 
What justifies restricting the reach of criminal law to voluntary acts 
that are performed with a guilty mind? It is the assumption that human 
beings have rational faculties that enable them to meaningfully choose 
whether to act in way A and not B or C. It would be unfair to hold people 
responsible, on this view, if delusion or duress keeps them from being able 
to reasonably decide to act in some other way. The conception of 
responsibility at the heart of our criminal law requires the kinds of 
 
28. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, 
MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 21 (2009) (explaining that causing harm is “neither sufficient 
nor necessary for moral responsibility” under the “moral view reflected in the structure of 
Anglo-American criminal law,” but instead “increases the blameworthiness of an already 
blameworthy defendant” when he tried to bring such harm about, or at least risked it). 
29. See Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
30. See United States v. Lyons 739 F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir. 1984) (“An adjudication 
of guilt is more than a factual determination that the defendant pulled a trigger, took a 
bicycle, or sold heroin. It is a moral judgment that the individual is blameworthy.”). 
31. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW, CH. IV (2008). 
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conscious intentions or beliefs on which basic acts may be praised or 
punished.32 
2. Perceptions 
Beyond abstractions, ordinary understandings about responsibility—
what it is, who has it, and under what conditions—also matter a great deal 
for the law.33 The way in which citizens think about responsibility informs 
more than just votes for elected officials who promise either law and order 
or criminal justice reform. Decisions about capital punishment depend on 
whether jurors think an “individual has lost his moral entitlement to live.”34 
After finding a defendant guilty of a death-eligible crime, jurors are 
afforded broad discretion to bring their beliefs about responsibility to bear 
on whether the defendant should live or die.35 Our law leaves the 
determination of mitigating factors and their balancing against aggravating 
ones to jurors’ open-ended judgments about which aspects of a 
defendant’s background, character, and crime they think make him more 
or less responsible.36 
Legislators also draw on perceptions of responsibility to determine 
which crimes get what punishments. The Eighth Amendment proportional 
requirements “forbid[] only extreme sentences that are grossly 
disproportionate to the crime.”37 That courts consider enacted laws to be 
the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary 
values”38 explains a judicial “tradition of deferring to state legislatures in 
making and implementing such important policy decisions.”39 This 
deference invests lawmakers with broad discretion to determine 
sentencing guidelines for certain classes of offenses or offenders based on 
 
32. See Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1592–
94 (1994). This is not to assume that criminal responsibility is necessarily compatible with 
decision making in a world that is deterministic. See Adam J. Kolber, Free Will as a Matter 
of Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 9, 17–18 (Michael 
Pardo & Dennis Patterson eds., 2016). 
33. See Emad H. Atiq, How Folk Beliefs About Free Will Influence Sentencing: A 
New Target for the Neuro-Determinist Critics of Criminal Law, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 449, 
467 (2013). 
34. Spaziano v. Florida, 465 U.S. 447, 468–89 (1984) (Stevens J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
35. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (invalidating limits on a jury’s 
consideration of mitigating factors). 
36. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998) (holding that the 
Constitution imposes no obligation on judges or legislatures to instruct capital jury on 
mitigating factors). 
37. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The 
Court has subsequently treated Justice Kennedy’s Harmelin opinion as controlling. See 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23–24 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
38. Roper, 543 U.S. at 331. 
39. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24–25 (2003). 
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their own beliefs (or those of their constituents) about what legal 
responsibility entails.40 
B. Equality 
Conceptions and perceptions of equality loom large among policies 
that entitle citizens to the same sort of rights or resources. The ideal 
implies shared qualities or relations among people that justify treating 
them equally.41 Equality claims carry moral force “because they are 
regarded as affirming an equality which is believed in some sense already 
to exist.”42 That is how Bernard Williams puts it. “[T]he normative 
conclusion that people ought to be treated equally,” Peter Westen infers, 
“rests on the factual premise that they are equal.”43 
The Declaration of Independence evokes this line between normative 
and descriptive equality in declaring people (at first, white men) “endowed 
with certain unalienable rights.”44 What motivates this normative equality 
is a descriptive equality which assumes that “all men are created equal.”45 
The Declaration upholds this basic sense of sameness among men (later 
extended to all people) as a moral condition for the law to ratify and 
implement. But it does not specify the sense in which people are equal in 
their intrinsic value or inherent worth. It famously proclaims that 
proposition and its meaning “self-evident.”46 My concern is the content of 
this descriptive claim, so frequently invoked to justify egalitarian laws and 
policies. 
1. Conceptions 
The conception of equality that moors antidiscrimination and similar 
laws most plausibly looks to the  powers that people share to reason about 
what is good and right.47 These equal capacities for what Rawls called 
“moral personality” lay the secure groundwork that resists disruption 
through data or demonstration.48 So human equality is not, on this view, 
 
40. The sentencing guidelines, while now advisory rather than mandatory, strongly 
encourage courts to abide by legislatively specified ranges. See United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 224, 264 (2005). 
41. See JOHN WILSON, EQUALITY 98 (1966). 
42. Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF 
THE SELF 111–12 (1973). 
43. PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY 266 (1990). 
44.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See Benjamin Eidelson, Treating People as Individuals, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 203, 213 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 
2013). 
48. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 442 (Harv. U. Press 2000) (1921); COONS & 
BRENNAN, supra note 25, at 41–43. 
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“the empirical claim that all groups of humans are interchangeable; it is 
the moral principle that individuals should not be judged or constrained by 
the average [or assumed] properties of their group.”49 
Affirmations of genetic similarity emerged as a way to dislodge the 
pernicious view that some people “are naturally inferior or . . . only fitted 
for a narrow range of opportunities and positions.”50 Nobel laureate 
Gunnar Myrdal explained that “the moral equality doctrine carried with it, 
even in America, a tendency toward a belief in biological egalitarianism” 
that denies meaningful genetic variation as a way to deprive group 
discrimination of its putative logic or justification.51 But it is a mistake to 
ground the moral equality of humans on their natural similarity—
difference becomes an argument for inequality.52 
2. Perceptions 
Real-world beliefs about equality matter too.53 One such context is 
voter support for funding of opportunities that privilege some at the 
expense of others. For example, the Head Start program provides small 
classes and better teachers to foster academic success;54 but the taxpayer-
funded program is costly and limited to low-income minorities.55 Citizens 
might deny funding to equalize opportunities through such policies if they 
deem the children who would benefit less worthy by their very nature. The 
Bell Curve provoked a national firestorm with its claims of a genetic basis 
for IQ differences between African-Americans and Caucasians.56 Authors 
Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein argued that socioeconomic 
disparities owe less to environmental factors like poverty, racism, and bad 
schools than to inferior aptitude by poorer performing minority students.57 
Genomics research today seeks to rehabilitate a personalized version 
of this connection between biology and school that distances itself from 
 
49. STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 
340 (2003). 
50. See, e.g., Philip Kitcher, An Argument About Free Inquiry, 31 NOUS 279, 281 
(1997). 
51. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 84 (1944). 
52. See A.W. Edwards, Human Genetic Diversity: Lewontin’s Fallacy 25 BIOESSAYS 
798, 801 (2003); see also James F. Crow, Unequal By Nature: A Geneticist’s Perspective 
on Human Differences, DÆDALUS 81, 84–85 (2002). 
53. See, e.g., Celeste M. Condit et al., Human Equality, Affirmative Action, and 
Genetic Models of Human Variation, 4 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 85, 100 (2001). 
54. See EDWARD ZIGLER & SUSAN MUENCHOW, HEAD START: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
AMERICA’S MOST SUCCESSFUL EDUCATIONAL EXPERIMENT 755 (1992). 
55. See id. at 17, 138. 
56. See RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE 389416 
(1994). 
57. See id. at 38993. 
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claims of entrenched inequality.58 “Genetic differences in human life are a 
scientific fact,” one researcher argues, and “knowing which genes are 
associated with educational success will help scientists understand how 
different environments also affect that success . . . . [I]f we want to invest 
wisely in interventions that can truly make a difference.”59 But when it 
comes to genetics research, it is notoriously difficult to wall off discussion 
about individual differences without implying group differences. Today’s 
studies of intelligence that never mention race are still invoked to argue 
that genes should decide which types of children get special access to 
scarce advantages.60 
III.  DISRUPTIVE DISCOVERIES 
The kind of research I am concerned with aims to build on 
generalizable facts about the world by using experimental means to 
generate or analyze them. Scientific inquiry systematically develops, 
refines, extends, or rejects established propositions in the pursuit of truth.61 
It accumulates empirical observations and trials to extend reliable 
explanations, predictions, and applications to more and more natural 
phenomena.62 Science seeks “to increase the store of human knowledge.”63 
That project becomes subversive when it challenges a dominant social 
ideology: here, the ideals of responsibility and equality so central to our 
democratic system. What matters is not just the abstract conception of 
those ideals, but practical perceptions of them. These real-world beliefs 
are what lay vulnerable to certain research in neuroscience and genetics. 
A. Neuroscience and Free Will 
  Two lines of neuroscientific inquiry have captured public 
imagination as a threat to popular understandings of responsibility. The 
first—imaging research—generates real-time pictures of the neural 
processes that explain human decisions.64 However free these decisions 
seem to us, some worry their visual representation threatens to expose 
 
58. See KATHRYN ASBURY & ROBERT PLOMIN, G IS FOR GENES 1421, 14146 (2014). 
59. Kathryn P. Harden, Why Progressives Should Embrace the Genetics of 
Education, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2K4odAa. 
60. See, e.g., Carl Zimmer, In ‘Enormous Success,’ Scientists Tie 52 Genes to Human 
Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2rLkFu3; Aaron Panofsky, What 
Does Behavioral Genetics Offer for Improving Education?, 45 HASTINGS CNTR. REP. S43, 
S49 (2015). 
61. See Carl G. Hempel, Inductive Inconsistencies, 12 SYNTHESE 439, 460 (1960). 
62. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 234 (2d ed., 
1970). 
63. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990). 
64. See DAWN M. MCBRIDE & J. COOPER CUTTING, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: 
THEORY, PROCESS, AND METHODOLOGY 36–37 (2d ed. 2018). 
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brain activity as the accumulation of genetic, environmental, and other 
causes, none of which we choose or control. The second—timing 
research—looks instead at whether the unconscious brain processes that 
precede and seem to initiate certain actions leave any room for conscious 
decisions.65 This section analyzes the challenge of causal determinism and 
preconscious bypassing, and argues that neither threatens the conception 
of responsibility in criminal law—which is not to say that they might not 
imperil the perceptions of that ideal. 
1. Brain Imaging 
Scanning technologies are no longer limited to static pictures of the 
brain to locate head injuries or neurological disease. Imaging tools can 
measure variations in blood flows and electrical waves to generate vivid 
detail of what is happening inside the brain at a particular point in time.66 
These operations are so complex it might never be possible to reliably or 
precisely predict the presence of deception, bias, or pain, let alone their 
influence on decisions.67 And yet, functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) studies have begun to yield evidence that can be used to identify 
which trial witnesses are lying,68 whether employment discrimination 
defendants are biased,69 and how much personal injury plaintiffs are 
suffering.70 
Cognitive scientists Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen have argued 
this research, by putting our brain activity on display in real-time and high-
resolution, shows that all mental states can be fully explained by the 
workings of the brain.71 “Every decision is a thoroughly mechanical 
 
65. See id. at 33–34. 
66. See id. at 34–36. 
67. See Emily R. Murphy & Henry T. Greely, What Will Be the Limits of 
Neuroscience-Based Mindreading in the Law?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEUROETHICS 
635, 642 (Judy Illes ed., 2011). 
68. See Shawn E. Christ et al., The Contributions of Prefrontal Cortex and Executive 
Control to Deception: Evidence from Activation Likelihood Estimate Meta-analyses, 19 
CEREBRAL CORTEX 1557, 1559 (2009). For further discussion, see Dov Fox, The Right to 
Silence Protects Mental Control, in 13 LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 335, 342–48 (Michael 
Freeman ed., 2011). 
69. See Harrison A. Korn et al., Neurolaw: Differential Brain Activity for Black and 
White Faces Predicts Damage Awards in Hypothetical Employment Discrimination Cases, 
7 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 398, 404 (2012). For additional discussion, see Dov Fox, Neuro-
Voir Dire and the Architecture of Bias, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 999, 1015 (2014). 
70. See Justin E. Brown et al., Toward a Physiology-Based Measure of Pain: Patterns 
of Human Brain Activity Distinguish Painful from Non-Painful Thermal Stimulation, PLOS 
ONE, Sept. 13, 2011, at 2, 7. For further discussion, see Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact 
and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions of Law, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 801, 811–16 (2012). 
71. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing 
and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS. ROYAL SOC’Y. B.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1778 
(2004). 
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process,” they say, “the outcome of which is completely determined by the 
results of prior mechanical processes.”72 
The brain is a physical thing subject to the rules of the physical world. 
The physical world is determined; therefore, the brain must also be 
determined. If the brain is determined and the brain enables the mind, 
thoughts and actions arising from the mind must also be determined 
occurrences rather than voluntary expressions of free will.73 
Imaging looks to reveal a causal bottleneck in the brain through 
which the sum of genetic, environmental, and other forces affect a person’s 
beliefs and behaviors.74 “Ordinary conceptions of human action and 
responsibility” are flawed, on this account, and “the legal principles we 
have devised to reflect these conceptions” accordingly require radical 
revision to reflect less robust accounts of free will.75 
The following real-world case illustrates the ostensible threat that 
brain imaging poses to responsibility. A 40-year-old man developed a 
sudden interest in child pornography and was thereafter convicted of child 
molestation for fondling his 12-year-old stepdaughter.76 Court records kept 
his name anonymous, so let us call him Russell. As a first-time offender, 
Russell could avoid incarceration by passing a simple treatment program. 
But he flunked, complaining of acute headaches. A brain scan revealed a 
tumor the size of an egg.77 After surgery removed the tumor, Russell’s 
urges toward children vanished. He then completed the treatment program 
easily and returned to his law-abiding self. However, when his urges 
returned months later imaging revealed that the tumor had as well. When 
it was once more removed, those impulses again went along with it.78 
Brain tumors like this are so rare that it might seem like a mistake to 
make too much of the example. But Uri Maoz and Gideon Yaffe explain 
how its implications reach beyond such vivid and fixable impairments on 
the individual’s capacity to act freely.79 Russell’s criminal behavior “is no 
different from anyone else’s,” they argue, in that it “has its source in the 
 
72. Id.; see also SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND ILLUSION 137–38 (2000). 
73. See generally Nita Farahany, A Neurological Foundation for Freedom, 2012 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4 (2012). 
74. See generally NADA GLIGOROV, NEUROETHICS AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVISION OF 
COMMON SENSE 46 (2016). 
75. Greene & Cohen, supra note 71, at 1779–80. 
76. See Jeffrey M. Burns & Russell H. Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with 
Pedophilia Symptom and Constructional Apraxia Sign, 60 JAMA NEUROLOGY 437, 437 
(2003). 
77. Id. at 438. 
78. Id. 
79. See Uri Maoz & Gideon Yaffe, What Does Recent Neuroscience Tell Us About 
Criminal Responsibility?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCE 120, 120–22 (2016). 
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person’s brain and his environment.”80 And “if we knew enough about the 
brain and our medical technology was sophisticated enough, wouldn’t 
every case in every courtroom be just like” this one?81 Perhaps not. Our 
criminal law operates to punish any adults who commit crimes, even if 
under the effect of mental illness, so long as they exhibit minimal capacity 
to reason or tell right from wrong. Russell’s case raises the question of 
whether culpability should turn on this threshold level of rational or moral 
capacity, or whether a person’s action can be traced less to his “will” than 
to the unchosen forces in his brain—genetics, randomness, or tumors—
that are themselves caused by a cascade of similarly unchosen forces that 
came before. 
It is difficult to imagine what visual representations of the activity in 
a person’s brain could prove him non-responsible for some act that he 
committed.82 People with the same brain scans might behave very 
differently. Unless someone lacks the minimal required capacity to reason, 
or has some other excuse, the criminal law still holds the person 
responsible even in a deterministic world.83 There is, however, a greater 
neuroscientific threat to responsibility. This comes from research about 
the timing of decision-making activity in the brain, which seems to suggest 
that unconscious brain events bypass our conscious intentions altogether. 
2. Brain Timing 
We think that we act when and how we intend to, even if those 
decisions are hasty. But timing experiments purport to show that intentions 
to act form only after those actions have been set into motion by 
unconscious activity in the brain. Intentions are less drivers of action, by 
this account, than side effects of neural mechanisms. Benjamin Libet 
pioneered this timing research in the 1980s.84 Libet measured brain activity 
in subjects using an electroencephalogram (EEG) device that looks like a 
hat with tentacles.85 With the EEG affixed to their scalp, subjects were 
asked to flex a finger at the exact moment they felt the urge to perform 
that simple movement.86 They reported that time using a modified clock 
 
80. Id. at 122. 
81. Id. at 121. For a critical discussion of this analysis, see generally Dennis 
Patterson, Criminal Law, Neuroscience and Voluntary Acts, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCE 355 
(2016). 
82. See Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation?, in 13 L. & NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT 
LEGAL ISSUES 529, 533 (Michael Freeman ed., 2010). 
83. See Adam Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807, 
82026 (2014). 
84. See BENJAMIN LIBET, MIND TIME: THE TEMPORAL FACTOR IN CONSCIOUSNESS 75-
78 (2004). 
85. See id. 
86. See id. 
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whose second hand swept 25 times faster than an ordinary one, marking 
off 40-millisecond intervals around the periphery.87 Participants reported 
when they intended to flex, while EEGs measured the onset of motor 
preparation.88 
These measures revealed a pattern. The recorded brain activity 
increased slowly leading up to the finger flexing, and then fell sharply after 
that movement. Libet called this horseshoe-shaped pattern of brain activity 
“readiness potential.”89 It showed up anytime subjects were asked to watch 
the clock and time their intent to move a finger—but not when they did 
not act on that intention—suggesting it represents the brain activity that 
sets human action into motion. Libet found the onset of this readiness 
potential consistently preceded, by a fraction of a second, the moment at 
which subjects said they had become aware of their intention to flex.90 
 
Timing Results of Libet Experiment 
−550 milliseconds −200 milliseconds 0 milliseconds 
Readiness Potential Reported Awareness Muscle Movement 
 
That the readiness potential began before the subjects’ reported 
awareness of their intention implies that this potential could not have been 
caused by their later-occurring intentions. The implication is arresting: I 
myself am not aware of whatever it is that activates the brain processes 
that make my body move. That initial trigger lies beyond my mindful 
control.91 
Some neuroscientists argue that this shows that the unconscious brain 
activity that precedes conscious intention encodes how a person will 
 
87. Id. at 8386. 
88. Id. at 9192, 96101. 
89. Id. at 133–36. 
90. Id. at 15157. 
91. See Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will?, 6 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 47, 51–
52 (1999). Libet’s finding that readiness potential precedes conscious intention has been 
replicated by scientists using more reliable ways to measure brain activity than those 
available to Libet. See, e.g., Chun S. Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free 
Decisions in the Human Brain, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 543, 54344 (2008). These new 
studies, like Libet’s, have found that the recorded brain activity preceded subjects’ 
awareness that they intended to press the button—this time, up to nine seconds before they 
realized that intention. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Lessons from Libet, in CONSCIOUS 
WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN LIBET 235, 237–38 (Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011). For further discussion, see Victoria Saigle et al., The 
Impact of a Landmark Neuroscience Study on Free Will: A Qualitative Analysis of Articles 
Using Libet and Colleagues’ Methods, 9 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 29, 41 (2018). 
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decide.92 Our minds backdate the subjective experience of conscious 
control, they argue, to a previous time at which readiness potential could 
be measured in the cortex.93 By inferring intentionality after the fact, we 
reorder our perception of events to preserve the sense that we intend our 
actions.94 Suppose these findings cannot be explained, as scholars have 
argued, by methodological flaws like inaccurate reporting times.95 That 
our unconscious brain activity predicts what we do before we decide to do 
it seems to relegate the conscious self to a spectator’s role in driving 
action. What we experience as intention is really part of an unconscious 
sequence set in motion long before.96 Our intentions are not causally 
determined by unchosen forces—instead, they are less conscious than 
unconscious.97 
To be sure, finger flexes are not the kind of reason-based action to 
which we usually assign responsibility. Detached from justifying or 
motivating grounds to choose among options, moreover, that decision is 
arbitrary. That it is initiated by unconscious brain processes may not, 
therefore, tell us anything about actions we have reason to care about for 
matters of responsibility.98 And besides, the very fact that unconscious 
brain processes precede a person’s urge to act does not crowd out a causal 
role for conscious agency or voluntary control. These findings still leave 
space—in the time before the readiness potential is activated—for the 
individual to choose either to permit or to prevent any of those urges. 
Neuro-timing studies have consistently found a window of time 
between the push-button of awareness of intent and the action itself that is 
more than sufficient for a person to decide whether to consummate an act-
in-progress. Libet himself wrote that the conscious mind stands guard like 
a gatekeeper, letting some of the “unconscious initiatives” that “‘bubbl[e] 
 
92. See Jeffrey P. Ebert & Daniel M. Wegner, Bending Time to One’s Will, in 
CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN LIBET 134, 137 (Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011). 
93. See TOR NORRETRANDERS, FEEL THE WORLD: THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
319 (1997). 
94. Say you are driving down a street when a boy runs in front of the car. Your 
awareness of the boy takes longer than (occurs after) braking to avoid him. See LIBET, 
supra note 84, at 183. 
95. See Alexander Batthyany, Mental Causation and Free Will after Libet and Soon: 
Reclaiming Conscious Agency, in IRREDUCIBLY CONSCIOUS 135, 137 (Alexander 
Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur eds., 2009); Daniel C. Dennett, The Self as a 
Responding—and Responsible—Artifact, 1001 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI.  39, 4243 (2006). 
96. John-Dylan Haynes, Beyond Libet: Long-term Prediction of Free Choices from 
Neuroimaging Signals, in CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN 
LIBET 85, 92 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011). 
97. See Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 
87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 328 (2002). 
98. See Dennis Patterson, Legal Dimensions of Neural Antecedents to Voluntary 
Action, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1, 8 (2014). 
ART 4 - SUBVERSIVE SCIENCE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/12/2019  11:59 AM 
170 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:1 
up’ in the brain” take completed form as actions, while holding others 
back.99 This gatekeeper view preserves a kind of veto power. This view 
demotes the role of the conscious will from the volition of free will to the 
regulation of free won’t. But it does not imply that our brain decides before 
we do.100 Timing research just shows, unremarkably, that “urges come 
before intentions.”101 
B. Genetics and Human Diversity 
Few lines of scientific research are more explosive today than inquiry 
into biological variation among groups. Human biodiversity is wholly 
uncontroversial as to certain individual differences in, for example, height. 
But invoking it is divisive as even a partial explanation for sex- or race-
based differences in other socially valued traits, such as athleticism or 
intelligence. Jonathan Haidt has rightly called genetic research into these 
kinds of group differences “the most offensive idea in all of science for the 
last 40 years.”102 
A wall has long protected respectable inquiry from accusations of aiding 
and abetting racism. That wall is the belief that genetic change happens 
at such a glacial pace that there simply was not time, in the 50,000 years 
since humans spread out from Africa, for selection pressures to have 
altered the genome in anything but the most trivial way (e.g., changes in 
skin color and nose shape were adaptive responses to cold climates).103 
Evolutionary pressure on populations in diverse geographical 
environments contributes to certain differences among groups that 
descended from them.104 Continental separation and reproductive 
isolation, together with genetic drift, natural selection, and countless 
environmental exposures, have generated complex patterns of biological 
diversity among ancestral groups.105 
 
99. LIBET, supra note 84, at 1, 7. 
100. See Nadelhoffer & Nahmias, infra note 145 at 173, 18182. Compatibilists may 
not even demand that timing research admit of this veto power for the state of this 
neuroscience to preserve the free will required for criminal responsibility. See Atiq, supra 
note 33, at 467; see also Kolber, supra note 83, at 82026 and accompanying text. 
101. See Timothy J. Bayne & Neil Levy, The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the 
Phenomenology of Agency, in DISORDERS OF VOLITION 49, 6364 (Natalie Sebanz & 
Wolfgang Prinz eds., 2006). 
102. Jonathan Haidt, Faster Evolution Means More Ethnic Differences, 
THEEDGE.ORG,  https://bit.ly/30Thvqy (last visited July 18, 2019). 
103. Id. 
104. See L. LUCA CAVALLI-SFORZA ET AL., THE HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF HUMAN 
GENES 16 (1994); YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND 525 
(2015). 
105. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 510–46 
(2002). 
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Until recently, our understanding of genetic variation was limited by 
too-similar population samples, low-density gene markers, and crude tools 
to measure them.106 But global collaboration now generates genome-wide 
data sets that make it possible to analyze variation across geographically 
diverse populations.107 In contrast to the field of genetics, which studies 
heredity one gene at a time, genomics enlists the far greater information 
enabled by genome-wide tools to study the effects of many genes all at 
once. 
Modern genetics creates a paradox with regard to human biological 
sameness and difference. Genetics confirms the close kinship and 
common origins of all humans and definitively establishes that race is a 
social, and not a biological, construct. At the same time, genetics 
provides a detailed array of information about individual variation at an 
exquisitely refined, molecular level. Genetics helps explain, among other 
things, why particular individuals differ in response to pharmaceutical 
products, have certain allergies, or should avoid certain exposures. 
Genetic information may even permit predictions about the future course 
of individual health and development.108 
Two strands of this research lurk as threats to equality.109 One looks 
at physical differences, ancestry tests, medical treatments, or forensic 
tools.110 The other concerns cognitive differences like intelligence.111 
1. Physical Differences 
Variants underlying even genetically simple physical traits, like skin 
color, can vary enormously in how they are expressed.112 But some traits 
do manifest group-based differences. Take lactose intolerance. People 
who can digest milk products as adults carry gene variants for the lactase 
 
106. See Hannah Pulker et al., Finding Genes that Underlie Physical Traits of 
Forensic Interest Using Genetic Tools, 1 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 100, 101 (2007). 
107. See Noah A. Rosenberg et al., Genetic Structure of Human Populations, 298 
SCI. 2381, 2384 (2002); Noah A. Rosenberg et al., Clines, Clusters, and the Effect of Study 
Design on the Inference of Human Population Structure, 1 PLOS GENETICS 660, 667 
(2005). 
108. Rothstein, supra note 3, at 453 (footnote omitted). 
109. See JONATHAN MARKS, HUMAN BIODIVERSITY: GENES, RACE, AND HISTORY 
18395 (1995).   
110. See generally Jonathan D. Kahn, Beyond BiDil: The Expanding Embrace of 
Race in Biomedical Research and Product Development, 3 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 61 (2009); Bert-Jaap Koops & Maurice H.M. Schellekens, Forensic DNA 
Phenotyping: Regulatory Issues, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 158 (2008). 
111. See Robert Plomin, Molecular Genetics and g, in THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF 
GENERAL INTELLIGENCE: TRIBUTE TO ARTHUR JENSEN 107, 108 (Helmuth Nyborg ed., 
2003). 
112. See Rebecca L. Lamason et al., SLC24A5, a Putative Caution Exchanger, Affects 
Pigmentation in Zebrafish and Humans, 310 SCI. 1782, 1786 (2005). 
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enzyme that breaks down dairy proteins. Selection for these variants 
appears in people who descended within the past 10,000 years from 
eastern Africa or northern Europe. These populations survived on dairy-
based farming, so drinking animal milk conferred a nutritional 
advantage.113 Lactose intolerance, pervasive in much of the world, is rare 
among modern Swedes, Danes, and Tutsis who share gene variants for 
lactose digestion.114 
Scholars express anxiety that genomic inquiries into group-based 
physical differences will shore up racial stereotypes or division.115 
Genocide, slavery, segregation, and sterilization, they note, have 
historically appealed to physical differences like skin color, hair type, and 
skeletal structure. These are differences that genetics research has the 
power to vindicate and legitimize.116 Some worry that forensic medicine 
and anthropology “may be used to revive long discredited 19th century 
theories of race” as a fact reducible to biology.117 Others fear that 
“increasing acceptance of DNA science that ascribes a genetic dimension 
to race has the potential to . . . usher in a new era of scientific racism.”118 
The idea that physical variation among groups has a biological basis 
indeed captured the public imagination in contexts from medicine to 
athleticism.119 But these kinds of skin-deep differences matter less than the 
cognitive or behavioral diversity it implicates. Whatever concerns genetic 
differences in physical traits might raise, their deeper disquiet relates to 
ramifications for natural hierarchies of intellectual capacity.120 
2. Mental Differences 
General intelligence—the ability to plan, reason, think abstractly, 
solve problems, grasp complex ideas, and learn from experience—
correlates relatively well with academic attainment and income.121 Twin 
 
113. See Dallas M. Swallow, Genetics of Lactase Persistence and Lactose 
Intolerance, 37 ANN. REV. GENETICS 197, 198–204 (2003). 
114. See Joachim Burger et al., Absence of the Lactase-Persistence-Associated Allele 
in Early Neolithic Europeans, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 3736, 3737–38 (2007). 
115. See Amy Harmon, The DNA Age: In DNA Era, New Worries About Prejudice, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/us/11dna.html. 
116. See TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 2 (2d ed. 2003). 
117. OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, PLAYING THE GENE CARD? A REPORT ON RACE AND 
HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGY, viii (2009). 
118. Christian B. Sundquist, The Meaning of Race in the DNA Era: Science, History 
and the Law, 27 TEMP. J. SCI., TECH. & ENVTL. L. 231, 265 (2008). 
119. See generally JON ENTINE, TABOO: WHY BLACK ATHLETES DOMINATE SPORTS 
AND WHY WE’RE AFRAID TO TALK ABOUT IT (2000). 
120. See Steven Rose et al., Should Scientists Study Race and IQ? 457 NATURE 786, 
789 (2009). 
121. See Jonathan A. Plucker & Amy L. Shelton, General Intelligence (g): Overview 
of a Complex Construct and Its Implications for Genetics Research, 45 HASTINGS CTR. 
REP. S21, S23–S24 (2015). 
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studies show that variation in IQ has a large, if mysterious, hereditary 
component.122 And behavioral geneticists have long sought gene variants 
to explain why some individuals have greater mental ability than others.123 
According to James Watson, the provocative Nobel laureate who co-
discovered the DNA double helix: “There is no firm reason that the 
intellectual capacities of people geographically separated in their 
evolution should prove to have evolved identically.”124 Recent years have 
seen renewed hopes that whole genomic sequencing on large enough 
samples to detect small effects across genetic differences will “make 
progress in understanding the genetic architecture of intelligence.”125 
Geneticists today can access international collaborations of genome 
data from thousands of high-IQ people worldwide in search of variations 
associated with intelligence.126 The promise of genome-wide association 
studies, or GWAS, to predict human traits across diverse populations is 
limited by their heavy reliance on research subjects of European 
ancestry.127  And the quest to identify intelligence-linked variants has so 
far revealed mostly null results and false positives.128 But recent DNA 
analysis of over 1,000,000 people used genetic probabilities to explain 
roughly 11% of differences in educational attainment—more than the 
variation predicted by parental schooling.129 Another research team 
identified three variants connected with higher levels of education 
attainment in nearly 130,000 people.130 A third team’s analysis of almost 
 
122. See Ziada Ayorech et al., Genetic Influence on Intergenerational Educational 
Attainment, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1302, 1307 (2017) (finding that genetics explained half of 
the differences in social mobility). 
123. See NICHOLAS WADE, A TROUBLESOME INHERITANCE: GENES, RACE AND HUMAN 
HISTORY 111–12, 221–22 (2014); see also Patrick D. Evans et al., Microcephalin, A Gene 
Regulating Brain Size, Continues to Evolve Adaptively in Humans, 309 SCI. 1717, 1720 
(2005). 
124. JAMES D. WATSON, AVOID BORING PEOPLE: LESSONS FROM A LIFE IN SCIENCE 
326 (2007). 
125. Erik Parens & Paul S. Appelbaum, An Introduction to Thinking about 
Trustworthy Research into the Genetics of Intelligence, 45 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S2, S2 
(2015). 
126. See Lee M. Butcher et al., Genome-Wide Quantitative Trait Locus Association 
Scan of General Cognitive Ability Using Pooled DNA and 500K Single Nucleotide 
Polymorphism Microarrays, 7 GENES, BRAINS & BEHAV. 435, 440–44 (2008). 
127. See Alice B. Popejoy & Stephanie M. Fullerton, Genomics is Failing on 
Diversity, 538 NATURE 161, 164 (2016). 
128. See generally Christopher F. Chabris et al., Most Reported Genetic Associations 
with General Intelligence Are Probably False Positives, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1314 (2012). 
129. See James J. Lee et al., Gene Discovery and Polygenic Prediction from a 
Genome-Wide Association Study of Educational Attainment in 1.1 Million Individuals, 50 
NATURE GENETICS 1112, 1115 (2018). 
130. See generally Cornelius A. Rietveld et al., GWAS of 126,559 Individuals 
Identifies Genetic Variants Associated with Educational Attainment, 340 SCI. 1467 (2013). 
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80,000 people turned up 52 genes linked to intelligence.131 All emphasized 
how small of an influence the specified genes combined to have on 
intelligence. 
Environmental, epigenetic, and other forces influence cognitive 
ability as well, beside the cumulative effects of thousands more genes 
awaiting discovery. The effect of these genetic variants may remain 
uncertain and unpredictable in any person, let alone group. That is because 
the small effects of myriad variants interact with other parts of the genome 
and surrounding world in ways that will simply be too complex to add 
up.132 Children adopted from working-class homes to middle-class ones 
see an IQ boost of 12–18 points, for example, while the IQ gap between 
African Americans and Caucasians has recently dropped by 0.33 standard 
deviation.133 These findings show that factors like socioeconomics have a 
substantial, if indeterminate, effect. 
  Charles Murray, co-author of Bell Curve, blames the “taboo against 
discussion of group differences” for sustaining a false “assumption of no 
innate differences among groups” that “suffuses American social 
policy.”134 Behavioral geneticist Robert Plomin affirms: “The unwelcome 
truth is that equal opportunity will not produce equality of outcome 
because people differ in g [intelligence] in part for genetic reasons,” 
despite the crucial role of “non-genetic factors” to “the development of 
individual differences in g.”135 Crude accounts of this genetic contribution 
have been deployed to naturalize and justify existing racial, ethnic, or sex 
disparities that cast certain groups as less worthy or well-suited for 
opportunities by virtue of their DNA. Even if g were fixed at birth across 
certain groups, that would not diminish the standing of some relative to 
others. And yet this idea can be lost on those who find in purported group 
differences a ready explanation for a range of social ills.   
 
131. See Suzanne Sniekers et al., Genome-Wide Association Meta-Analysis of 78,308 
Individuals Identifies New Loci and Genes Influencing Human Intelligence, 49 NATURE 
GENETICS 1107, 1109–10 (2017). 
132. See Eric Turkheimer, Genetic Prediction, 45 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S32, S35–S37 
(2015). 
133. Richard E. Nisbett et al., Intelligence: New Findings and Theoretical 
Developments, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 130, 142 (2012). But see Bo Winegard et al., Getting 
Voxed: Charles Murray, Ideology, and the Debate on IQ, QUILLETTE.COM (June 2, 2017), 
https://bit.ly/2WoZnFu. 
134. Charles Murray, The Inequality Taboo, AM. ENTER. INST. (Sept. 1, 2005), 
https://bit.ly/2WnmMqR. 
135. Robert Plomin, Genetics and General Cognitive Ability, 402 NATURE C25, C29 
(1999). See generally ROBERT PLOMIN, BLUEPRINT: HOW DNA MAKES US WHO WE ARE 
(2018) (examining the influence of people’s genetics on their observable characteristics). 
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C. How Science Subverts 
Equality and responsibility are cornerstones of our liberal democracy. 
If these ideals are under siege by advances in neuroscientific and genomic 
research, it is not because existing science has established that individuals 
of sound mind are not responsible for their actions or less equal than the 
members of another group. Indeed, these normative ideals may be 
altogether immune to empirical challenge.136 This does not prove, 
however, that science is not subversive. After all, legal theorists are not 
the ones who put those ideals into practice. Their operation relies instead 
on legislators, voters, judges, and jurors—scientific and philosophical 
laypeople who cannot apply relevant training and expertise to their 
understanding of these ideals or their susceptibility to empirical findings. 
These decision-makers are vulnerable to fictions about agency and identity 
that steer conclusions about responsibility and equality astray. Biases 
about mechanism and essentialism represent the genuine and pressing risk 
that subversive science poses to democratic ideals. 
1. Beliefs about Mechanism 
The two lines of neuroscientific inquiry examined in this section 
invite distinct cognitive biases at odds with human agency. Imaging 
research implicates an assumption of causal determinism that many think 
compatible with holding people responsible for what they do. 
Determinism holds that people’s actions and intentions are themselves 
caused by a jumble of forces, none of which they chose or exercised 
control over. Timing research, in turn, triggers a sense of preconscious 
bypassing that is much harder for people to square with lay perceptions of 
responsibility. Bypassing is the idea that what seems like a person’s 
intentions, in fact, results from unconscious urges, such that his 
consciousness plays no causal role in acting this way and not that. 
a. Determinism 
Psychologists measure how much imaging research triggers beliefs 
in determinism and the effect on perceptions of responsibility. One study 
asked 1,170 Americans to take part in a mock trial that presented them 
with either psychological or neuroscientific expert evidence to support a 
defense of “not guilty” by reason of insanity.137 Researchers concluded that 
 
136. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick asks whether aliens that are 
smarter than humans would be justified in treating humans the way we treat cows. See 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (2d prtg. 2013). Query the implications for 
fetuses, persistent vegetative state (“PVS”) patients, and anencephalic babies. 
137. See Nicholas J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, Neuroimage Evidence and the 
Insanity Defense, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 592, 594–95 (2011). 
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“framing mental illness” in neurological terms “remove[s] some 
skepticism on the part of jurors by making the underlying mechanism of 
the mental illness more concrete.”138 Far more than psychological 
evidence, the neuroscience convinced subjects that a defendant lacked 
control over his otherwise criminal conduct.139 
A second study presented participants with one of two different 
descriptions for the same deterministic universe.140 One adopted explicitly 
neuroscientific terms to describe how decisions for outcomes are made, 
while the other used psychological terms that highlighted—in place of 
brain activity—the role of thoughts and desires in decision-making for 
those effects.141 88.6% of subjects in the psychology group agreed that 
people could be held morally responsible, compared to just 40.7% of those 
in the neuroscience group, a result that researchers attributed to 
deterministic priming.142 
The impact of such priming faces crucial limits, however. Another 
recent study asked subjects to imagine a person wore a device that would 
create pictures of his brain capable of predicting his every decision with 
perfect accuracy.143 In some situations but not others, the device would let 
his actions be manipulated by a scientist.144 It turns out that perfect 
prediction by itself was not enough to erode perceptions of praise or blame. 
Only when the predictive tool was accompanied by an outside actor’s 
capacity to alter outcomes did subjects decline to attribute 
responsibility.145 Similar studies bear out this conclusion.146 In the absence 
of mind-control-like exploitation, exposure to imaging research tends to 
feed exaggerated beliefs in determinism. These reduce ascriptions of 
blame, but only modestly. 
b. Bypassing 
Attributions of individual responsibility are characteristically 
weaker, by contrast, if a person’s mental state is deprived of any causal 
role in her actions. This is the challenge of preconscious bypassing that 
 
138. Id. at 604. 
139. Id. 
140. See Eddy Nahmias et al., Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: 
Experiments on Folk Intuitions, 31 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 214, 218 (2007). 
141. See id. at 218. 
142. Id. at 227, 232. 
143. See Eddy Nahmias et al., It’s OK If ‘My Brain Made Me Do it’: People’s 
Intuitions about Free Will and Neuroscientific Prediction, 133 COGNITION 502, 504 (2014). 
144. See id. at 505. 
145. See id. at 512–14. 
146. See Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias, Explaining Away Incompatibilist 
Intuitions, 88 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 434, 439 (2012); Dylan Murray & Tania 
Lombrozo, Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation, Free Will, and Moral 
Responsibility, 41 COGNITIVE SCI. 447, 469 (2017). 
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brain timing research poses. Studies like Libet’s suggest to the lay or 
casual reader that the preconscious urges a person neither chooses nor 
controls crowd out the conscious intentions he has in driving the decisions 
he makes to take this action rather than that one.147  “If neural processes 
completely explain our actions,” some take away from these experiments, 
“then what causal work is left for our beliefs and desires to do?”148 
It is not so hard to see how buying into bypassing might lead people 
to question the general assumption that individuals are responsible for 
their actions. Consider the following survey study: Half of all participants 
read an excerpt that described the timing-based premise behind 
bypassing—namely, what people experience as conscious intentions are 
really just unconscious electrical signals within the brain.149 This group 
was then asked to adjudicate a sentence for a hypothetical murderer. So 
were the other half of subjects, except they read a different passage 
instead.150 Those who read the brain-timing article advised average 
sentences that were 50% shorter than did those who were not presented 
with that neuroscience research.151 Similar results support the hypothesis 
that laypeople’s confrontation with brain timing studies encourages a 
belief in conscious bypassing at apparent odds with traditional 
commitments to individual responsibility.152 
2. Beliefs about Essentialism 
“Genetic essentialism” is the psychological driver linking exposure 
to genomics research to perceptions of equality.153 Essentialism represents 
the idea that groups are “natural kinds” whose members have basic 
 
147. See infra Section III.A.2. 
148. Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias, Neuroscience, Free Will, Folk 
Intuitions, and the Criminal Law, 36 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 157, 171–72 (2011). 
149. See Azim Shariff et al., Free Will and Punishment: A Mechanistic View of 
Human Nature Reduces Retribution, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1563, 1565 (2014) (citing FRANCIS 
CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE SOUL 14 (1994)). 
150. See id. at 1566. 
151. See id. For a discussion of this research, see Gunnar Björnsson, Incompatibilism 
and “Bypassed” Agency, in SURROUNDING FREE WILL: PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, 
NEUROSCIENCE 95, 115 (Alfred R. Mele ed., 2014). 
152. See Eddy Nahmias & Dylan Murray, Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An 
Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions, in NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 189, 
207 (Jess Anguilar et al. eds., 2010); Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle, From 
Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People’s 
Folk Concept of Free Will, 1 REV. PHIL. PSYCHOL. 211, 219–20 (2009); Eddy Nahmias, 
Autonomous Agency and Social Psychology, in CARTOGRAPHIES OF THE MIND: PHILOSOPHY 
AND PSYCHOLOGY IN INTERSECTION 169, 180 (Massimo Marraffa et al. eds., 2007); Hoi-
Yee Chan et al., Free Will and Experimental Philosophy, in A COMPANION TO 
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 158, 168 (Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter eds., 2016). 
153. Ilan Dar-Nimrod & Steven J. Heine, Genetic Essentialism: On the Deceptive 
Determinism of DNA, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 800, 808 (2011). 
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“essences.”154 This idea casts members of a certain race, ethnicity, or 
gender as sharing the sort of fixed and inborn characteristics that often 
support stereotypes, prejudice, racism, or nationalism.155 Social 
psychologists have distinguished two types of genetic essentialism: 
biosomatic and biobehavioral. 
a. Biosomaticism 
Biosomatic essentialism holds that membership in a group is 
immutable, uniform, inherent and natural, and discrete as a function of 
physical markers like height and skin color.156 Biobehavioral essentialism 
goes beyond the physical to ascribe group members genetically inherited 
behaviors.157 Lay confrontation with human genomics research about 
physical differences reinforces the biosomatic essentialism that many in 
modern American society already accept as true.158 
This form of genetic essentialism holds that a person’s biological 
essence as expressed through his physical characteristics does not change, 
whatever his lived experience, group interaction, or self-identification.159 
This helps to explain why, when subjects were asked to read evidence of 
biologically-based physical differences among racial groups—rather than 
evidence that race is uninformed by genetic differences—they were more 
likely to endorse essentialism beliefs and to exhibit nearly 20% higher 
levels of racial prejudice and negative stereotyping.160 After reading an 
article that connected genetics to a greater risk of disease for members of 
a racial group, those subjects were more likely to associate certain other 
 
154. See Brock Bastian & Nick Haslam, Psychological Essentialism and Stereotype 
Endorsement, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 228, 232 (2006). 
155. Michael R. Andreychik & Michael J. Gill, Do Natural Kind Beliefs about Social 
Groups Contribute to Prejudice?: Distinguishing Bio-somatic Essentialism from Bio-
behavioral Essentialism, and Both of these from Entitativity, 18 GROUP PROCESSES & 
INTERGROUP REL. 454, 455 (2015). 
156. See id. at 456. 
157. Id. See also Michael J. Gill & Dana M. Mendes, When the Minority Thinks 
“Essentially” Like the Majority: Blacks Distinguish Bio-Somatic from Bio-Behavioral 
Essentialism in Their Conceptions of Whites, and Only the Latter Predicts Prejudice, 11 
PLOS ONE 1, 13 (2016) (distinguishing biosomatic and biobehavioral essentialism). 
158. See Brian M. Donovan, Framing the Genetics Curriculum for Social Justice: An 
Experimental Exploration of How the Biology Curriculum Influences Beliefs About Racial 
Difference, 100 SCI. EDUC. 586, 589 (2016). 
159. See Francisco J. Gil-White, Are Ethnic Groups Biological “Species” to the 
Human Brain?, 42 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 515, 523–25 (2001) (discussing a study 
finding that Mongolian participants would still regard a child as “Kazakh” if his genetic 
parents were Kazakh but he was adopted at birth by a Mongolian family, raised only by 
Mongolians, and learned only Mongolian customs and language). 
160. See Jo C. Phelan et al., The Genomic Revolution and Beliefs about Essential 
Racial Differences: A Backdoor to Eugenics?, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 167, 173–75 (2013). 
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limited traits of skill or personality with the “genetic makeup” of that 
race.161 
b. Biobehavioralism 
These specious associations are stronger and more prevalent in the 
case of biobehavioral essentialism that links genetic differences directly to 
traits like intelligence and temperament at the heart of mental group 
differences research.162 Several studies have indicated that adherents of 
biobehavioral essentialism show diminished engagement with racial 
equality.163 One study presented subjects with a battery of questions on 
beliefs in biosomatic and biobehavioral essentialism—for example: “The 
primary reason why parents and children are so similar in their behavior, 
personality, and character is that they share much of their DNA”; and 
“Most of the physical traits in human beings can be traced back to their 
genes”— before measuring their prejudice levels using the “Modern 
Racism Scale.”164 Biosomatic essentialism barely correlated to prejudicial 
views at just 0.20; the 0.66 correlation with biobehavioralism was more 
than three times as predictive.165 
  Other studies of group essentialism and negative stereotyping have 
arrived at similar indictments of biobehavioral beliefs over and above 
biosomatic ones.166 More pernicious than perceiving groups as innate 
kinds with physical differences, is thinking all their members “share the 
‘seed’ of negative behaviors ‘deep down inside’ (even if not all members 
are currently showing those bad behaviors).”167 This belief that genes 
encode human identity, of course, reflects an inflated view of the way 
 
161. See Alexandre Morin-Chassé, Public (Mis)understanding of News about 
Behavioral Genetics Research: A Survey Experiment, 64 BIOSCIENCE 1170, 1177 (2014). 
162. See Brian M. Donovan, Learned Inequality: Racial Labels in the Biology 
Curriculum Can Affect the Development of Racial Prejudice, 54 J. RES. SCI. TEACHING 379, 
382 (2016). 
163. See Melissa J. Williams & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Biological Conceptions of 
Race and the Motivation to Cross Racial Boundaries, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1033, 1041 (2008). 
164. See Andreychik & Gill, supra note 155, at 461–63. 
165. See id. at 463. 
166. See Johannes Keller, In Genes We Trust: The Biological Component of 
Psychological Essentialism and Its Relationship to Mechanisms of Motivated Social 
Cognition, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 686, 689–90 (2005); see also Benjamin 
Y. Cheung & Steven J. Heine, The Double-Edged Sword of Genetic Account of 
Criminality: Causal Attributions From Genetic Ascriptions Affect Legal Decision Making, 
41 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1723, 1736 (2015) (finding that genetic 
explanations of criminal behavior reduce ascriptions of control, while increasing 
perceptions of dangerousness). 
167. See Andreychik & Gill, supra note155, at 466. 
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genes contribute to people’s sense of self.168 And yet there is a widespread 
perception that DNA imparts natural and immutable traits in a way that 
makes it easy to see different individuals as belonging to discrete and 
unvarying groups.169 
3. Education and Worldviews 
Two other factors plausibly mediate reported beliefs about equality 
and responsibility. The first is the extent to which people are conversant 
in scientific facts and concepts that could impact their understanding of 
and/or receptiveness to neuroscientific or genetic findings. The second is 
the sort of ideologies that comprise cultural worldviews. Either might 
inform reported beliefs about cherished ideals in ways that operate 
independently of or in connection to beliefs about either mechanism or 
essentialism. 
a. Scientific Literacy 
The half of Americans who know the Earth takes a year to orbit the 
Sun might be assumed to think differently about genetic or neuroscientific 
information and its implications than those who mistakenly think that 
Earth orbits in just a day.170 Those less conversant in scientific facts and 
concepts might accordingly be presumed more deferential to scientific 
authorities or less critical of unreliable findings.171 Their weaker basis for 
independent appraisal or duly skeptical judgment might make them more 
susceptible to accepting superficially credible implications of scientific 
evidence that a more informed evaluation would not substantiate. On the 
other hand, unfamiliarity with basic science may lead some to reject such 
research as elite propaganda, leading them to resist scientific explanations 
even more. 
 
168. See Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the 
Egalitarian Ethos, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 567, 594–95 (2007). 
169. See JOHN H. EVANS, WHAT IS A HUMAN? WHAT THE ANSWERS MEAN FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS 60–65 (2016); Jason Schnittker et al., Nature, Nurture, Neither, Nor: Black-White 
Differences in Beliefs about the Causes and Appropriate Treatment of Mental Illness, 78 
SOC. FORCES 1101, 1132 (2000). See also Boby Ho-Hong Ching & Jason Teng Xu, The 
Effects of Gender Neuroessentialism on Transprejudice: An Experimental Study, 78 SEX 
ROLES 228, 230 (2018) (identifying essentialist beliefs about purported differences 
between men and women as a major source of prejudice against transgendered individuals). 
170. Nat’l Sci. Bd., Science & Engineering Indicators 2016, NSF.GOV, 
https://bit.ly/2CLtCJk (last visited July 18, 2019). 
171. See Dominique Brossard & Matthew C. Nisbet, Deference to Scientific 
Authority Among a Low Information Public: Understanding U.S. Opinion on Agricultural 
Biotechnology, 19 INT’L J. PUB. OP. RES. 24, 45–47 (2007) (finding that scientific 
knowledge plays a modest role on deference to scientific authorities in the context of 
research related to agricultural biotechnology). 
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b. Cultural Worldviews 
  Another factor plausibly complicates the effect that subversive 
science has on attitudes about equality and responsibility: namely, diverse 
visions about what makes society good. New findings can offer evidence 
either for or against these rival visions.172 Those visions may be informed 
by factors like race, gender, age, geography, education, religion, 
personality, or political affiliation.173 For example, those inclined to a 
hierarchical rather than egalitarian outlook might be suspicious of genetics 
research purporting to show that individuals from all groups are 
meaningfully similar. One might likewise expect those who hold 
communitarian as opposed to individualist values to sense that brain 
research only validates whatever existing doubts, they have that adults of 
sound mind are morally responsible for their behaviors and should be held 
legally so in the absence of justification or excuse. Past studies suggest 
that cultural beliefs about morally-laden values, such as responsibility and 
equality, motivate reasoning about related facts.174 
III.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 These data call for steps designed to help social institutions produce 
and disseminate knowledge more effectively.175 My analysis reframes the 
threat that controversial lines of inquiry present in terms of actual 
perceptions rather than abstract conceptions. This reframing, in turn, 
advises targeting the communication of knowledge instead of its 
production. Therefore, I reject direct government or university restrictions 
on research in lieu of evidence-based approaches to public engagement 
and science communication. These strategies must be deployed to combat 
not just alternative facts, but also cognitive biases from biogenetic 
essentialisms to neuroscientific determinism or bypassing. This Part 
identifies and analyzes the chief reason that the government has for 
regulating subversive science of the kind I studied here. I argue that this 
reason—the state’s interest in preserving secular democratic ideals—is 
wholly legitimate, albeit insufficiently forceful, to justify any of the direct 
or intrusive research restrictions that I specify here. 
 
172. See generally MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN 
ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1983) 
(explaining political conflict as a struggle between adherents of competing approaches to 
ideals of egalitarianism and individualism). 
173. See Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory 
of Risk, in HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY 725, 746 (Sabine Roeser et al. eds, 2012). 
174. See JONATHAN L. GROSS & STEVE RAYNER, MEASURING CULTURE: A PARADIGM 
FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 6 (1985). 
175. See generally Elizabeth Anderson, The Epistemology of Democracy, 3 EPISTEME 
8–22 (2006) (introducing and developing the concept of “institutional epistemology”). 
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A.  Research Regulation 
Direct regulation by the scientific profession could take form in 
informal norms or formal codes of conduct that societies, agencies, review 
boards, funding foundations, or journals set forth to limit what is funded, 
permitted, or published.176 The problem is that no professional paradigm 
could justify the kind of self-regulation that would respond to the risk of 
subversiveness.177 The consent model, for instance, derives duties from 
scientists having chosen to enter their profession—but nothing about that 
voluntary entrance decision implies any commitment to democratic 
ideals.178 No more promising is the gatekeeper model of public dependence 
on access to scientific progress—it affords no resources to bootstrap a 
concern for subversion.179 Both suggest an emphasis on three dimensions 
of research: funding, free speech, and public morals. 
1. Funding 
Government funding is another way to regulate costly scientific 
research that requires state or federal support if private sources cannot 
provide enough. Funding decisions provide regulatory control. Yet the 
government has no obligation to subsidize even the most worthy and 
promising lines of research; indeed, it has no duty to fund science at all. 
The state must fund only constitutionally mandated activities and 
institutions like elections, federal courts, and national defense. The 
political process allots all other funding through deliberation and deal-
making.180 A growing school of scientific researchers, that a recent New 
York Times profile referred to as the “intellectual dark web,” fear that their 
pursuit of controversial lines of inquiry will not only cut off their public 
funding but may even get them fired.181 
The government weighs in on the relative worthiness of various 
pursuits whenever it funds some projects over others. In the scientific 
research context, consider President George W. Bush’s policy restricting 
 
176. See The Editorial Board, Should Scientists Toy With the Secret of Life?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2Jr4ZZW. 
177. See Harvey Brooks, Lessons of History: Successive Challenges to Science 
Policy, in THE RESEARCH SYSTEM IN TRANSITION, 11, 12 (Susan E. Cozzens et al. eds., 
1990). 
178. See Norbert Elias, Scientific Establishments, in SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENTS 
AND HIERARCHIES 3, 42-49 (Norbert Elias et al. eds., 2012). 
179. Daryl Chubin & Terence Connolly, Research Trails and Science Policies: Local 
and Extra-Local Negotiation of Scientific Work, in SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENTS AND 
HIERARCHIES 293, 301 (Norbert Elias et al. eds., 2012). 
180. Peter Berkowitz, The Meaning of Federal Funding (President’s Council on 
Bioethics, unpublished working paper), https://bit.ly/2Wsa5uK. 
181. See Bari Weiss, Meet the Renegades of the Intellectual Dark Web, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 8, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2IrkbW4. 
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federal funding for any stem cell research involving the destruction of live 
embryos.182 That policy still allowed the federal government to fund 
existing stem cell lines using embryos that had already been destroyed, as 
well as state or private funding to create new cell lines.183  The political 
right decried the policy as unprincipled—If life has absolute worth, then 
all embryo research must stop!184 The left lambasted it as sectarian—Life-
saving therapies cannot be forsaken for the sake of eight-cell organisms!185 
But neither side could rightly complain that the policy violated any 
entitlement to state funding for certain kinds of projects over others.186 
2. Free Speech 
  Modern democracies operate under a presumption that government 
should not interfere with the content of scientific inquiry.187 Scholars have 
long defended an asserted right of scientific speech to be free from state 
interference in deciding what and how to study, teach, or publish.188 This 
is not a demand for resources or facilities to advance knowledge, but a 
protection against its active suppression.189 Proponents have sought to 
justify this right as an element of academic freedom, a precondition for 
free and open expression, or a form of expressive conduct.190 What makes 
science a matter of constitutional concern is its distinctive status—like art 
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or philosophy—as a vital way in which citizens produce new knowledge. 
The validity of restrictions depends on “the strength of relevant state 
interests.”191 
  Subversive science does not endanger tangible interests such as 
public health or national security; it does not deprive research subjects of 
informed consent or cause them avoidable pain or suffering.192 Neither 
genetics nor neuroscience research can discredit the theoretical 
foundations of cherished ideals like responsibility and equality. This is so 
even as people’s exposure to new discoveries may nevertheless lead them 
to doubt those ideals in just this way. Timing research does not “destroy 
our capacity to function as moral agents” any more than the discovery of 
genetically affected group differences would destroy our understanding of 
people as moral equals who share the same worth and dignity as others.193 
The threat that these lines of inquiry present is how susceptible they are to 
being misunderstood as showing that people lack free will or equal worth. 
3. Public Morals 
Constitutional and practical problems beset legal restrictions on 
science to preserve those same democratic ideals that its dissemination 
threatens to subvert.194 Responsibility and equality are less concrete at the 
level of values than public goods of safety or welfare, despite questions 
about definitions and measurement. State concern for the intangible norms 
is nonetheless rational, indeed imperative, given their centrality to the 
effective functioning of political institutions.195 And their preservation 
violates no constitutional decree. Affirming those ideals neither singles out 
protected classes, for example, nor takes sides on religion. Yet it is far 
from clear that this interest in secular ideals central to democratic culture 
is strong enough to support direct or onerous restrictions on subversive 
science. 
The Supreme Court raised questions about the government’s 
authority to legislate morality in a very different context when it struck 
down a ban on gay sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas.196  Justice Kennedy held 
for the majority that moral disapproval of homosexuality failed to justify 
a prohibition on private consensual conduct.197 The Court’s holding left 
unclear, however, how broadly its skepticism about the public morality 
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interest applies. Does it apply narrowly, only to values that demean 
unpopular groups, as Justice O’Connor suggested in her concurrence?198 
Or does it sweep so broadly that, as Justice Scalia lamented in his dissent, 
Lawrence “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation[?]”199 
Whichever interpretation prevails, the state’s interest in sustaining public 
perceptions of responsibility and equality is, at any rate, too weak to justify 
restrictions on subversive science.200 
Even if it were constitutional for the government to force researchers 
to look here rather than there, such limits would make for bad policy. First, 
who can predict the effects of restricting research? As explained by 
psychologist Chris Chabris, restrictions designed to be narrow can still 
“distort[] researchers’ priorities and can harm the understanding of related 
topics” when their foreseeable spillover on shared proofs and methods 
“causes mistakes in other areas as well.”201 The second casualty of research 
restrictions is the organic serendipity that characterizes many crucial 
scientific discoveries, ranging from X-rays to recent innovations in cut-
and-splice DNA.202 The government should be thus wary of interfering 
with the direction that scientific research takes, any more than its grant 
funding power already does. Non-state institutions also promote or 
constrain research by awarding or denying grants, promotions, speaking 
requests, and publication offers. The next section explains. 
B. Public Engagement 
The scientists who produce knowledge, the journalists who transmit 
it to the public, and the legislators and judges who integrate it into law all 
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have crucial roles in managing risks of subversive science.203 Scientists are 
rarely equipped to answer the moral or religious questions raised by their 
research.204 The ethics of stem cell research or gene editing, for example, 
turn on how we value embryos—between persons and property—and 
whether or why the natural lottery matters.205 Non-scientists cannot avoid 
navigating these matters for themselves. What Judge Richard Posner has 
called the “fear and loathing”206 that Americans show to science should 
not lead us to write off its more contentious expressions as “inaccessible 
to popular comprehension and uncontrollable by democratic decision-
making.”207 To facilitate constructive public engagement, I recommend a 
combination of research incentives, communication, and framing. 
1. Incentives 
Many think scientists should stick to research and leave specialized 
reporters to translate and transmit their results and implications.208 
Scientists themselves, however, will remain in demand to give media 
interviews, testify in courts and before Congress, and address local 
community forums.209 However, modern graduate education fails to 
prepare scientific researchers to explain their work and its relevance to 
non-academic audiences. For basic and applied research, universities train 
scientists to focus on narrow questions within a much larger puzzle, all 
while reporting the facts and data that they study and interpret in the 
technical language and media of their discipline. 
Ph.D. students go on to run their own labs without having learned 
how to explain why their work matters or how to convey that meaning or 
significance to audiences of laypeople. Yet a team of Carnegie Mellon 
scientists recognized that the ability to message effectively requires special 
training before research falls under public scrutiny.210 And once science 
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graduates go on to run their own professional labs, decisions about grants, 
prizes, publication, promotion, and tenure almost never reward such 
participation in science festivals, public debates, science-art 
collaborations, and other citizen-science enterprises.211 
Most scientists lack the background, talent, or incentive to translate 
the significance and limits of their research for non-scientists in light of its 
wider implications.212 Institutions that employ or fund scientists should 
provide training programs to help them translate findings more clearly and 
effectively for a general audience.213 Programs might include professional 
meetings, online modules, and internship or residency programs to teach 
researchers to brief their work using “legislator-derived, value-based 
criteria to evaluate each option and produce a final recommendation.”214 
Modules in neuroscience and genetics, in particular, might focus on the 
subversive dimensions of research. 
2. Communication 
Research funders should also encourage and expect scientists to 
develop plans for public communication and outreach. For example, the 
National Science Foundation requires applicants who engage in basic 
research across disciplines, including genetics and neuroscience, to 
include in any proposal an impact review that answers questions like: 
“Will results be disseminated broadly to enhance scientific and 
technological understanding?” and “What may be the benefits of the 
proposed activity to society?”215 Now is the time for scientific institutions 
and organizations to make science communication a priority. Doing so 
could involve promotional incentives, leave time, and social recognition 
that rewards public lectures, media work, and development of training 
activities. Compensation metrics could, for instance, integrate audience 
size, reach, evaluations, and other proxy measures of impact and 
excellence in the communication of subversive science.216 
This culture of science communication should supplement the 
training of researchers and reporters skilled in and dedicated to the craft of 
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transmitting (subversive) science between the scientists who produce 
knowledge and the non-scientists who consume it.217 Knowledge brokers, 
such as science journalists, build networks and exchange information in 
contextualized, respectful, and intelligible ways among practitioners, 
policymakers, and citizens. They must receive training in genetics and 
neuroscience alongside an appreciation of their larger implications, 
associated biases, and corrective framings.218 To train knowledge brokers, 
academic and media institutions should identify promising candidates 
based on their interest and critical thinking. Second, these institutions 
should develop programs to train these recruits to examine, synthesize, 
filter, and adapt subversive science across a range of media to reach 
diverse audiences.219 
3. Framing 
Potentially biasing information does not come with a warning label. 
Effective warnings about the pull of mechanistic or essentialist biases can 
disrupt exaggerated expectations by inducing a temporary state of 
skepticism that prompts consideration of the research and its implications 
with a more critical or discriminating eye.220 Social psychology research 
on these warnings suggests that, to be effective, they must explain the 
specific ways in which these biases operate as people process 
neuroscience, genomics, and other research that carries the power to 
disrupt cherished ideals.221 
One crucial place to combat the misperception of subversive science 
is in the courtroom. Trial judges always issue instructions to jurors in 
criminal cases—to deliberate only after all of the evidence has been 
presented, for example, and to make a decision based only on that 
evidence.222 Judges may also instruct jurors to disregard or scrutinize some 
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evidence.223 When expert facts and opinion testimony impart subversive 
science in court, judges should at least caution jurors to critically appraise 
its weight and reliability and warn them of proven limits.224 Judges could 
inform jurors that neuroscience research, for instance, shows which parts 
of the brain are active when one person or another is performing a 
particular task, clarifying that neither timing nor imaging studies can 
determine any specific cause of individual thoughts or actions.225 Judges 
must take special care not to lead jurors astray. But they can and should 
make them aware of those biases, like determinism or bypassing, that 
exposure to such evidence commonly invites.226 
Cautionary instructions will not be enough to contain the risk that 
some subversive science poses in the courtroom. The rules that govern 
scientific expert evidence bar testimony that is invalid, irrelevant, or 
unduly misleading.227 Expert analysis of a brain scan or neuroimaging or 
timing studies must, to be admissibly relevant, “reliably apply the 
principles and methods” of “specialized knowledge” in a way that tends to 
make some fact “of consequence in determining the action . . . more or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”228 Even relevant 
evidence is excluded if it is far less probative of that consequential matter 
than it is confusing or prejudicial.229 Are brain-imaging or timing studies 
relevant to the conditions required for criminal responsibility? And does 
testimony about that research provide markedly less to prove that fact than 
it does to prejudice jurors?230 
Brain images can relate directly to a subject’s head injury, and 
indirectly to certain facts related to mental states or conditions like 
knowledge or psychosis. And studies suggest that evidence like this does 
not tend to bias or misinform.231 But is neuroscience relevant to and 
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probative of basic responsibility? Recall that timing and imaging research 
measures brain activity while a subject performs an experimental task that 
bears little resemblance to what any defendant is alleged to have done.232 
Indeed, even individual “causation by a brain abnormality” will be hard-
pressed to “remove criminal responsibility” in the absence of available 
facts about control of the particular defendant’s behavior at the time of the 
crime.233 Proving relevance to matters of criminal responsibility will be 
trying. 
Publications that control the dissemination of subversive science also 
have a role to play in helping ordinary people appreciate the facts and 
concepts that underlie it. Those who transmit this knowledge in peer-
reviewed journals or popular media should avoid decontextualized 
coverage or sensationalist headlines. These oversimplify the complex 
causes of behavior or overstate the ability of technology to image the brain 
or decode the genome. But scientists and science writers can and should 
do more than that to communicate potentially subversive science in a way 
that is sensitive to the values it implicates.234 
For now, journals could require lay summaries like the warnings 
advised above to accompany the publication of unruly research in 
neuroscience and genomics.235 Such summaries might include similar 
caveats that findings need not be taken to prove that traits are hard-wired 
or that free will is an illusion. Making warnings measured will help guard 
against their backfiring and priming people to cling to misperceptions 
more tenaciously.236 Similarly, framing behavioral genetics through the 
lens of individuals rather than groups, and framing neuroscientific findings 
in terms of contributions instead of causes, can diffuse culturally driven 
impulses to read too much into this research.237 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
How can subversive science attend to threats of legal instability, 
cultural turmoil, and political unrest without being shackled by fear, 
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dogma, or cynicism? I began by asking whether there are truths too 
disturbing or divisive to pursue or reveal. Controversy about subversive 
science has long revolved around supposed threats that certain research 
findings pose to abstract understandings of cherished ideals. This Article 
has proposed reorienting the debate toward concern for the public 
commitment to those ideals. This move shifts away from philosophical 
conceptions to psychological perceptions. Scientific research that does not 
endanger abstract conceptions of democratic ideals can still risk actual 
perceptions of them. And these real-world consequences are what matter 
most for law and policy. 
 
